If truth is beauty and beauty truth it is only because we have already decided that true things are beautiful and that what is appealing does not deceive, for it is so very often that upon encountering actual things that are true we find them to be essentially uninteresting, patently unappealing, disappointing or actively distasteful. Once in the thrall of such a preconception it is easy to select examples of true things which happen to appeal in some other way also, and to pass over the contents of the enormous list, inescapably far longer than a list of all such things that could ever give us pleasure, comfort, hope or joy, of items that are either of no account due to their extreme triviality or are in some way onerous, oppressive, or intolerable to life but which are nevertheless true facts about the universe.
This must explain the excessive number of true and verifiable things of which someone might become aware but that very few or none will ever actually come to know, and for good reason: Were we to gain immediate access to the truth of everything around us we would quickly become overwhelmed, subsumed, engulfed, etc. by the deluge of information, descriptive data, parameters, contingencies, eventualities, coincidences, consequences and facts in all their resplendent minutiae, with a total paralysis of our sensibility the inevitable result.
The beauty of beauty is that it can be comprehended, beheld, perceived directly and immediately understood. Impervious to doubt, beauty is something unquestionably felt. The truth, however, is always open to question, always open to doubt and uncertainty. The truth may be hidden; something might have been missed, something that was not immediately obvious might have led us into error. And though unlike truth people can differ, even dramatically, in their estimation of what is beautiful and what is not, and not fall into error, those who come to know beauty indeed cannot be mistaken in that particular estimation, and only in this way is beauty a certain kind of truth, but not because the object of beauty itself partakes of the truth, or because the truth is itself an object of beauty.
